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￿ . ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
The only way to tackle the unresolved problem of chronic pain is to
study it from different perspectives, that is, a multidisciplinary approach.
It seems to me that as philosophers, we cannot talk about pain if we do
not take into account other disciplines, (e.g. physiology, neurobiology,
cognitive sciences, and psychology) because pain is not only a sensation,
nor a perception, but both. The perception of pain by an individual is
highly complex and individualised, and it depends on a variety of exter-
nal and internal influences. The somatosensory cortex is concerned with
the appreciation of pain and its quality, location, type and intensity. But,
in addition to neural influences, which transmit and modulate sensory
input, the perception of pain is affected by psychological and cultural
responses.
In this work, I envisage exploring the nature of pain as a typical
state of consciousness, while taking account of its physiological and
phenomenological aspects, in order to start a discussion regarding the
body-mind problem.
The current definition of pain is not complete because it is impossible
to identify the nature of pain beyond affirming that it concerns a dis-
agreeable feeling due to a corporal lesion. Some physiologists regard
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pain as a sensation, in which, it is not necessary to take consciousness
into account to define the physiological mechanisms. Some philosophers
regard it as an intentional mental state without taking into account its
neurophysiological aspects to understand its mechanisms in the brain
and its relationship with the mind. In addition, some psychologist re-
gard pain from its emotional aspect and somatisation. These approaches
are incomplete because of the complex nature of pain, in which, other
important aspects are also implicated (e.g. culture). Pain constitutes a le-
gitimate sensation, and a perception too, in the sense where the painful
sensation is necessarily integral as a representation. This is to say, con-
sciousness of a bodily lesion is subjected to several levels of comprehen-
sion.
Pain, like all other perceptions, can result in illusions, hallucinations
(such as a phantom limb), cognitive influences (such as the analgesia
of the soldier, or the athlete), and of pathologic elements in which the
stimulus is disassociated from representation. The pain of a phantom
limb indicates that the brain generates the experience of pain, and that
we do not need a lesion to perceive pain, nor a body to feel a body.
With these bases, pain would be the subjective representation of a
corporal injury, which includes:
(1) The sensitive element (quale of a painful feeling).
(2) The affective (the aversive emotions which provoke pain).
(3) The volitional (disposing action).
(4) The cognitive (the recognition of the injury, identification and ex-
planation of the perceived feeling).
(5) The behavioral (the movements, the lamentations).
(6) The cultural (the modulation of the painful experience caused by
the social and cultural apprenticeship, as well as the influence of
personal beliefs).2
These elements join together to integrate a complex representation of
pain in which each reveals itself as physical and mental.
I shall argue that we cannot consider pain as a determined physio-
logical state (the activation of fiber C conducting the painful informa-
tion), as it is necessary to explain the quality of the pain, and its phe-
nomenological aspect in respect to the neurobiological mechanisms.3
Thus, in this document, I propose to study pain as a psychophysical
and cognitive mechanism with neurobiological bases, as a subjective,
and qualitative experience. In this way, the given neurophysiological
2 All of the above are explained in (Díaz, 2007).
3 These neurobiological mechanisms enable us to identify pain in our organism.
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and phenomenological should correlate to constitute a psychophysical
process. One should be capable to integrate these two perspectives of
pain: the objective and the subjective. This approach would consider the
psychophysical, and neurophilosophical.
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Pain is defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain
(IASP) as “an emotionally disagreeable sensory experience associated
with a damaged tissue past, or potential, or described in terms of such
damage” (Pain, 1986: 250). But, even if this definition takes into ac-
count the fact that the patient can accept he has no lesion, it seems to
me that the definition is insufficient. The “disagreeable feeling” is too
vague of an expression to clarify matters. However, this definition is at
least consequential, and important, in the sense that it considers pain as
something subjective. This is to say, above all, as a state of consciousness,
and not just as a sensory modality.
Moreover, this definition considers the experience of pain as implying
diverse associations between the sensory and the affective states, which
is profoundly aversive. In this sense, pain would not uniquely be a sen-
sation, but also an affective reaction. In other words, pain would not
only be a sensation translated into a repulsive emotion, but would, in
addition, be a cognitive experience. Nevertheless, this definition, as it
stands, destroys the belief some neuroscientists maintain where pain is
a noxious sensation exclusively generated by neuronal mechanisms in
the brain. The subjectivity of pain does not only depend on internal
mechanisms, but also on external sources which could not simply be de-
duced by a brain without contact with its environment. The emotional
dimension participates in the genesis of pain. The culture of the individ-
ual, his beliefs, his motivations, and even his economy are implicated in
the perception of his pain.
Pain is much more than the perception of a simple sensation. All
painful perception has a subjective character that is modulated by the
context in which pain intervenes: its meaning, the previous experiences,
the culture, even the socio-economic standing of the individual, and his
psychological state (anxiety, depression, etc.). But, it does not seem pos-
sible to prove a correlation of these elements, nor does it seem possible
to bring about an understanding of the process that surrounds the na-
ture of the consciousness of pain. For the time being, we can just try to
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bring some ideas, which direct us, gradually, to the scientific discovery
of the mechanisms of the consciousness of pain.
The idea would be to seek a theory that could explain the physiolog-
ical, the cognitive, and the philosophical functions of pain in a unified
model.
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Pain is a process in time, in which its different components are linked
and mixed in diverse ways, in order to form a whole. This is a complex
and distinct representation, which one can call, a painful consciousness.
The distinction of the components that would be necessary to make an
analysis is not clear because the painful experience is integrated.4 A pri-
ori, each of these elements is revealed as physical and mental. As in the
case of consciousness, the spatial location of pain can be disconcerting.
Irrespective to the type of pain, (acute, chronic, inflammatory, etc.) the
subject who normally perceives it, makes reference to the place of the
lesion; however, pain is in the brain. This organ fails to be sensitive to
injury, which is a strange, and ironic fact.
It is assumed that pain is found in the brain because the painful tracts
that leave the nociceptive receptors arrive there, and it appears that it
is also in the brain where the feelings, and perceptions, are integrated.
Although, we still do not have good evidence, at least not one that is
definitive, to indicate how this integration is produced. Furthermore,
we still have no evidence to explain in which way the distinctive quality
of pain is produced (e.g. its quale).
There is always a dichotomy between the phenomenological experi-
ence and the scientific evidence: I can perceive a pain in my finger, but
in reality, it is in my brain, and not in my finger. In the same way, we
could say that one can perceive the outside world, as an exterior, but
in reality this world is perceived by our mind. Thus, it is in our brain.
“Pain is a representation of a corporal injury in the same way that the
visible world is a representation of the space before my eyes, which is
constructed in the brain after the transduction by the cones and rods of
my retina” (Tye, 1995).
In any case, when one talks about consciousness, whether it be that of
pain or the ability to see objects, and all sorts of elements that surround
us, it is not easy to make a distinction between objects, mental represen-
tations, the stimuli which provoke these perceptions, the quality of these
experiences, and our social and cultural beliefs. Further, it would seem
4 This is due to the fusion of its components.
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that it is exactly in the convergence of all these factors that consciousness
emerges.
￿ . ￿￿￿ qualia ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿-￿￿￿￿
We should analyse the painful experience. What is the “painful” of pain
experience? The answer may be the qualia.5 In other words, the qualita-
tive aspects of the painful experience, the brute and primary sensations
of the entire state of consciousness (Hansberg, 2003).
To have an experience is to be in a certain state, or to live through
something specific. Can we know how the pain of cancer is if we do not
have this disease? We could perhaps imagine it, but we will never feel
its effects in order to perceive its pain. This, leads us to affirm that in
order to talk about qualia, we need to believe in mind and subjectivity.
It is difficult to know if a new born could have any perception of pain,
or if he just feels a pure sensation, because of its lack of experience. To
perceive a pain, we have to have been alive. So, if we consider that the
new born had an experience of “life”, in the womb, in all the extension of
the word, and its implications in the mind and the body, then we could
affirm that the baby perceives pain. Qualia constitute the most intimate
and specific aspect of mental capacity. We do not know its physical basis,
and that is why the quale is so mysterious and challenging.
While the nervous information has similar characteristics in all the
cerebral sectors, (for example the schema of electric discharges is anal-
ogous to relatively comparable neurons), the modality of feelings and
perceptions is phenomenologically distinct. Common examples of this
are the redness of an apple, or the concept of liberty, or tooth pains, or
the odor of fresh grass. For the time being, it is impossible for us to
comprehend how a physiological phenomenon could have a subjective
aspect of something so particular and dramatic as pain, in its various
aspects of negative quality, punitive, and noxious consciousness.
But, the most difficult problem to be understood, regarding qualia is
to know if they are purely a representation. That is to say, if the brute
feeling already has a term of reference, or if there is something in qualia
which escapes functional representation. Further, even if for the time
being it is difficult to make a proposition which could be proved with
psychobiological experiments, we could possibly consider a psychobiol-
ogy of qualia, but not merely a biological one.
5 The plural of quale
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One could propose that consciousness could be an emerging property
of cerebral activity, and in this case, one could say that pain could corre-
spond to a neuro-mental state. However, such emergence, which would
be a functional property, should be correlated to a physiological process
that must be well defined. For the time being, we are incapable of such
definition. This leads us directly to the problem of mind-body. We must
begin to understand the functioning of this emergent process.
In any case, I propose that pain is not only a nervous process, but that
it could have a correlation with this process. This is not causality, but a
match; reciprocity. This would be:
I avoid the concept of identity and propose one of correlation (with
the signs). These two processes could form an independent study, but
the result of such studies (of nervous processes) would have to have a
significant correlation with the mental states of the individual perceiving
pain. This correlation is necessary, as the two aspects, the physiological
and the phenomenological, should correspond. There would be neither
hard pain, nor a crucial neurological process, without a painful experi-
ence.
This formula of correlation opens a door for us to the study of the
mechanisms in the consciousness of pain. It could serve to study, not
only the aspects of information about pain, but also the sense of the
painful quality that should be correlated with the nervous and cognitive
aspects of the experience of pain. This would take into account the rela-
tion between the qualitative aspect of the mental states of the experience
of pain and its neurophysiological aspects.
To arrive at such a stage, it might be necessary to ask which are the
specific neurotransmitters involved in the ‘painful’ process. In other
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words, we would need to identify which are the brain areas implicated in
this process, the specific structures, their mechanisms, and interactions.
One should also find significant correlations with qualitative aspects of
the ‘painful’ experience because we are concerned with the qualitative
aspects of the nervous process.
This suggested proposal would be a first step towards the compre-
hension of the complex processes in the brain. We are not yet able to
find a solution to the central problem of the consciousness of pain, but
at least, we can find a way to develop a theory of pain by taking into
account all the disciplines involved.6 In any case, it would appear to
be undisputable that the psychophysical correlations are preliminary in
explaining the qualitative aspects of consciousness, while taking into
account the qualia of pain as one of the phenomenological aspects in
relation to those neurobiological aspects which comply.
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